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I.

INTRODUCTION

Perhaps Justice Black was correct when he explained the
importance anonymity has played “in the progress of mankind” by
allowing “[p]ersecuted groups and sects from time to time
throughout history . . . to criticize oppressive practices and laws.” 1
Since the revolutionary era, an individual’s right to speak and write
anonymously has been a component of the First Amendment. 2
1. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64–65 (1960).
2. See, e.g., Victoria Smith Ekstrand & Cassandra Imfeld Jeyaram, Our
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History shows that the Framers engaged in anonymous political
writing, perhaps most famously when Alexander Hamilton, John
Jay, and James Madison published eighty-five essays known as
“The Federalist Papers” under the pseudonym “Publius.” 3 However,
while individuals have historically used newspapers to speak
anonymously, over the last decade, individuals have used the
Internet to speak anonymously. 4
The introduction and mass increase of digital and online
Internet communications over the last decade has challenged
established legal rules and the basic premises of the traditional
First Amendment anonymous free speech doctrine. 5 Today, millions
of people rely on online reviews in order to make decisions regarding
what products and services they purchase, where to travel, and
many other choices. 6 Reviews by users can reveal problems and
defects with products warning potential consumers of the risks of a
product or service and in some cases even leading companies to
remedy the problem and do right by the consumer. 7 Additionally,
the nature of the Internet and the characteristics of online speech
have “sparked an avalanche of legal claims” over the privacy rights
of online speakers. 8 A large number of online privacy lawsuits
center around the requested identification of anonymous online
posters. 9 As a result, lawyers, judges, and scholars have “struggled
to reconsider the rationales for and the limits of anonymity in the
Internet age.” 10 One challenge that has come to the forefront in
developing model legal standards is determining when the harms of
Founding Anonymity: Anonymous Speech During the Constitutional Debate, 28
AM. JOURNALISM 35, 53 (2011) (arguing that anonymous speech was “inextricably linked” to the founding of the nation).
3. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 360 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (illustrating the outpouring of anonymous political
writing that occurred during the ratification of the Constitution).
4. See Sophia Qasir, Note, Anonymity in Cyberspace: Judicial and
Legislative Regulations, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3651, 3652 (2012) (stating that
the expansion of the Internet is stretching the outer limits of anonymous speech
rights).
5. See Jason M. Shepard & Genelle Belmas, Anonymity, Disclosure and First
Amendment Balancing in the Internet Era: Developments in Libel, Copyright,
and Election Speech, 15 YALE J.L. & TECH. 92, 94 (2012) (discussing the history
behind anonymous speech and the First Amendment).
6. See Susannah Fox & Maeve Duggan, Peer-to-Peer Health Care, PEW
RESEARCH INTERNET PROJECT (Jan. 15, 2013), http://www.pewInternet.
org/2013/01/15/peer-to-peer-health-care (reporting that 80 percent of Internet
users consult online reviews).
7. See David Kirkpatrick, Why There’s No Escaping the Blog, FORTUNE (Jan.
10,
2005),
http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/
2005/01/10/8230982/index.htm (reporting that an anonymous review claiming a
flaw in a bike lock caused the company to replace approximately 100,000 locks
for free).
8. Shepard & Belmas, supra note 5, at 94.
9. Robert D. Brownstone, 1 Data Sec. & Privacy Law § 9:170 (2014).
10. Shepard & Belmas, supra note 5, at 95.
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anonymity are significant enough to justify an incursion on the
right to anonymity. 11
Recently, in Yelp v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, the Virginia
Court of Appeals addressed whether Yelp, an online social network
review service, could be forced to reveal the identities of anonymous
reviewers for the purposes of a defamation suit. 12 The court held
that, under Virginia’s “unmasking” statute, section 8-01-407.1, “a
local business was entitled to enforce a subpoena against a social
media reviewing site, to reveal information leading to the identities
of reviewers.” 13 The court’s decision and the standard it used to
make that decision contravenes other court decisions, such as
Dendrite International v. Doe, Doe v. Cahill, and standards from
other jurisdictions, which address the same question. 14
This Comment argues that the Supreme Court of Virginia
should first reverse the Virginia Court of Appeals’ decision when it
hears the Yelp case later this year. Secondly, the court should hold
that the Virginia statute for identifying persons communicating
anonymously over the Internet violates the First Amendment’s
required showing of merit on both law and facts before a subpoena
duces tecum to identify an anonymous speaker can be enforced. 15
Lastly, it should adopt a new “unveiling standard” similar to the
standards used in either Dendrite or Cahill. 16 Part II examines the
jurisprudential history of identifying anonymous Internet speakers
in defamation cases, namely the prominent standards that have
been adopted in many other jurisdictions such as Maryland,
Delaware, and New Jersey. Part III argues that the Virginia Court
of Appeals incorrectly interpreted Virginia Code section 8.01-407.1
and erred in finding the statute constitutional. Part IV concludes
that requiring the identification of anonymous Internet users in
defamation cases can be consistent with the First Amendment as
long as the identification findings are consistent with the Dendrite
standard.

11. See id. at 98 (addressing the notion that First Amendment right to
anonymity, while important, cannot be absolute).
12. See generally Yelp, Inc. v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, Inc., 752 S.E.2d 554
(Va. Ct. App. 2014).
13. See id. at 566.
14. See Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 460 (Del. 2005) (developing one standard
for when the identity of an anonymous defendant should be revealed); Dendrite
Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 771–72 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001)
(setting forth another standard with regard to revealing a defendant’s identity).
15. See generally VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-407.1 (2014) (requiring a showing of
merit on both law and facts before a subpoena duces tecum can be enforced to
identify an anonymous speaker).
16. See John Villasenor, When Should The Authors Of Anonymous Online
Reviews Be Revealed? Yelp Challenges A Court ‘Unmasking’ Order, FORBES
(Feb. 7, 2014), http://onforb.es/1o1KEab (discussing how many courts have
adopted either the Dendrite or the Cahill tests).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The First Amendment and the Right to Anonymity
Anonymity has a long history in American discourse, and the
right to speak anonymously is protected by the First Amendment. 17
The Supreme Court has held that content-based restrictions on fully
protected speech imposed by states and compelled identification of
anonymous persons are valid if “narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest.” 18 For example, in Talley v. California,
the Court held unconstitutional a city ordinance that prohibited the
distribution of anonymously printed handbills. 19 Thirty-five years
later, the Supreme Court expanded the protections for anonymous
free speech in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, striking
down an Ohio statute prohibiting the distribution of anonymous
campaign literature, and stating that an author’s decision to remain
anonymous was “an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the
First Amendment.” 20 In Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, the
Supreme Court held that online speech should enjoy the same First
Amendment constitutional protection as traditional forms of
speech. 21

B. Defamation and the Limitations of Free Speech
While the Supreme Court has held that the value of free speech
is accorded greater weight than the dangers of its potential misuse,
the right to speak anonymously is not absolute, and plaintiffs have
the right to seek redress for harmful anonymous speech under a
claim of defamation. 22 In Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper, the
Court explained that the falsity of a statement is only material to a
defamation claim if the statement affects the subject’s reputation in
the community. 23

17. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995)
(stating that this freedom traditionally extended beyond the literary realm).
18. See id. at 335 (identifying that restrictions on this type of speech are
subject to strict scrutiny).
19. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64–65 (1960) (discussing how the
Supreme Court struck the ordinance down).
20. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342 (arguing that anonymous works outweigh
any public interest in requiring disclosure).
21. See 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997), aff’g 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D.Pa. 1996).
22. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 353, 357–58.
23. See Air Wis. Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. 852, 856 (2014) (defining
a materially false statement as one that would have a different effect on the
mind of the reader or listener from that which the truth would have produced).
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1. Commercial Speech
While anonymous speech can be defamatory, it can only be
punished in full accordance with First Amendment principles. 24
However, courts have held that less protection is offered to
“commercial speech” as compared to literary, religious, or political
speech. 25 In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission of New York, the Supreme Court defined commercial
speech as expressions that are solely related to the “economic
interests of the speaker and its audience.” 26 The Court, however,
has made clear that commercial speech is an extremely narrow
category and is limited to advertising that does no more than
“propose a commercial transaction.” 27 The Court stated that the
definition of “proposing a commercial transaction” intended to
encompass any advertising that informed possible buyers where to
buy an item, the price of a item, and the advantages of an item. 28
The Fourth Circuit has also gone on to list other factors that
determine whether speech is considered commercial, including
whether it is an advertisement, 29 refers to a specific product or
service, and whether the speaker has an economic motivation. 30 In
Lefkoe v. Joseph A. Bank Clothiers, the Fourth Circuit held that an
anonymous stockholder’s letter to a company’s audit committee was
commercial speech because the letter was solely related to the
economic interest of the speaker and its audience. 31
In Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., the
Court indicated that the First Amendment protected the
publication of information and opinions about products offered to

24. See Yelp v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, Inc., 752 S.E.2d 554, 560 (Va. Ct.
App. 2014) (stating that defamation is not immune from constitutional
limitations and must be measured by standards that satisfy the First
Amendment).
25. See id. (explaining that commercial speech is accorded less First
Amendment protection than other forms of speech).
26. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 561, 563 (1980) (defining commercial speech as speech that serves the
economic interest of the speaker and also assists consumers and furthers
societal interest).
27. See id. at 562 (distinguishing between speech proposing commercial
transaction and other varieties of speech).
28. See id. at 580 (citing examples such as a salesman’s solicitation, a
broker’s offer, and a manufacturer’s publication of a price list or the terms of his
standard warranty).
29. See Advertising, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009), available at
Westlaw BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (defining advertising as alerting the public
to promote a sale).
30. See Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor & City
Council of Balt., 721 F.3d 264, 285 (4th Cir. 2013) (listing factors to consider in
deciding whether speech is commercial).
31. See Lefkoe v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 577 F.3d 240, 248 (4th Cir.
2009) (agreeing that the Doe Client’s letter was commercial speech).
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the public. 32 The Supreme Court has held that criticism of a
commercial product or service is not commercial speech simply
because it might injure the plaintiff’s business interests, and even
if it is commercial speech, it can still be fully protected if it is
truthful. 33 The Court has also ruled that commercial speech may be
restrained if it is false, misleading, or advertises unlawful activity
and that any governmental restraint must advance a substantial
public interest and must not be more extensive than necessary to
serve that interest. 34
2. Libel-Proof Plaintiff Doctrine
In many jurisdictions, plaintiffs may not challenge a negative
published statement under a claim of defamation if the plaintiff had
a sullied reputation before the publishing of a challenged
This
prohibition
is
called
the
libelstatement. 35
proof plaintiff doctrine, which bars relief to such plaintiffs as a
matter of law. 36 The libel-proof doctrine applies in two narrow
contexts. 37 One is the incremental libel-proof doctrine, which
bars libel awards when an article or broadcast contains highly
damaging statements, but the plaintiff challenges only a minor
assertion in the communication as false and defamatory. 38
3. Online Defamation
An Internet search for an uncommon name or for a small
business will likely return a short list of results, increasing the
chance that a negative comment stands out. 39 Defamation law is
often difficult for courts to apply in Internet cases because of the
32. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S. Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 513 (1984)
(stating that erroneous statements are inevitable in free debate and must be
protected if freedoms of expression are to have the breathing space they need to
survive).
33. See CPC Int’l v. Skippy Inc., 214 F.3d 456, 462–463 (4th Cir. 2000)
(stating speech critical of a corporation is not a sufficient reason to enjoin the
speech).
34. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 593 (stating false and misleading
commercial speech is not entitled to First Amendment protection).
35. See Note, The Libel-Proof Plaintiff Doctrine, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1909, 1909
(1985) (stating that plaintiffs are barred from relief when statements do not
damage their already sullied reputations).
36. See id. (defining libel-proof plaintiff doctrine).
37. See id. at 1910–11 (stating issue-specific context and plaintiff challenges
only a minor assertion).
38. See id. at 1909 (explaining the limitations of claiming libel for some
plaintiffs).
39. See generally Erik P. Lewis, Note, Unmasking “Anon12345”: Applying
an Appropriate Standard when Private Citizens Seek the Identity of Anonymous
Internet Defamation Defendants, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 947 (2009) (showing that
businesses as well as individuals are susceptible to online defamation).
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vast amount of people involved in hosting sites and posting
messages. 40 Under the Communications Decency Act, websites and
ISP’s are not liable for any material that was provided or created by
another user, regardless of whether the material is protected under
the Constitution. 41

C. Unmasking Standards and a Jurisprudential
History
When the identity of an individual is unknown in an online
defamation case, plaintiff must file a “Doe” lawsuit without any
named defendant, and then serve a subpoena on the Doe’s Internet
Service Provider to obtain information regarding the poster’s
identity. 42 In determining whether or not to unveil an anonymous
speaker’s identity, most courts use frameworks that balance the
poster’s First Amendment right to remain anonymous against the
plaintiff’s right to assert its claim against a known, discernible
target and obtain redress for wrongs ostensibly inflicted by that
target. 43 Along with First Amendment balancing of the right to
speak anonymously, a basic unmasking standard or statute will
normally also have three other components: notice; an evidentiary
showing on the merits of the claim; and the need for the identifying
information. 44 The majority of variance amongst different states
regarding unmasking standards often revolves around the latter
two components. 45
1. The Dendrite and Cahill Standards
The prevailing view used amongst courts requires a plaintiff to
put forth sufficient evidence to withstand a hypothetical summary
judgment motion, seen most prominently in Dendrite International

40. See Allison E. Horton, Note, Beyond Control?: The Rise and Fall of
Defamation Regulation on the Internet, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 1265, 1296 (2009)
(noting the complexity of applying libel law to the Internet).
41. See Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133
(codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 230, 560–61).
42. See id.
43. See Robert D. Brownstone et al., 1 Data Sec. & Privacy Law § 9:170
(2014) (stating that a variety of different standards exist: summary judgment;
balancing test; motion to dismiss).
44. See Matthew Mazzotta, Note, Balancing Act: Finding Consensus on
Standards For Unmasking Anonymous Internet Speakers, 51 B.C. L. REV. 833,
848–57 (2010) (laying out the skeleton of a nondescript, standard unmasking
statute).
45. See S. Elizabeth Malloy, Anonymous Bloggers and Defamation:
Balancing Interests on the Internet, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1187, 1193 (2006)
(claiming that too high a standard for plaintiffs to meet can fail to protect
victims by failing to give them the necessary tools to bring their defamers to
court).

2015]

The Right to Anonymous Speech on the Internet

701

v. Doe No. 3 46 and Doe v. Cahill. 47 In Dendrite, the court held that
before obtaining an order requiring the disclosure of an anonymous
defendant’s identity, the plaintiff is required to: (1) undertake
efforts to notify him/her of the subpoena and provide sufficient time
for opposition to such application; (2) set forth the exact statements
claimed to constitute the actionable speech; and (3) present
sufficient evidence on each element of the cause of action to
demonstrate a prima facie claim. 48 The court must then balance the
defendant’s First Amendment right of anonymous free speech
against both the strength of plaintiff’s prima facie case and the
necessity for disclosure of the Doe defendant’s identity. 49 Because of
its strength, the Dendrite standard has become the leading
standard in the United States, having already been adopted in over
a dozen states. 50
In Doe v. Cahill, the Delaware Supreme Court modified the
Dendrite standard, explaining that the plaintiff must make a prima
facie case for each element of the defamation claim over which he
has control. 51 Essentially, the court disregarded the second and
fourth standards from Dendrite and retained versions of the first
and third: the plaintiff’s efforts to notify the defendant must be
reasonable and the plaintiff must also satisfy the summary
judgment standard. 52 Elements of both Dendrite and Cahill were
used in Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie. 53 In this case, the
46. See 775 A.2d 756, 766 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (showing that a
plaintiff needs to demonstrate a prima facie claim).
47. See 884 A.2d 451, 457 (Del. 2005) (holding that a defamation plaintiff
must satisfy a “summary judgment” standard).
48. See Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760–61.
49. See id. (stating that only if the plaintiff can make these three showings
will the identity of the defendant be revealed).
50. See, e.g., Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 170 P.3d 712 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007)
(discussing and ultimately adopting a Dendrite–Cahill hybrid standard);
Gallucci v. New Jersey On-Line LLC; Independent Newspapers v. Brodie, 966
A.2d 432 (Md. 2009) (adopting the Dendrite standard). (New Jersey, Maryland,
Delaware, Arizona, California, Indiana, New Hampshire, Texas, Pennsylvania,
and the District of Columbia); see also In re Indiana Newspapers, 963 N.E.2d
534 (Ind. App. 2012) (adopting the modified Dendrite test); Pilchesky 1 v.
Gatelli, 12 A.3d 430 (Pa. Super. 2011) (stating that the reviewing court must
conduct the Dendrite balancing test); Mortgage Specialists v. Implode-Explode
Heavy Indus., 999 A.2d 184 (N.H. 2010) (ordering the trial court to apply
Dendrite test); Solers v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941 (D.C. 2009) (stating that the
summary judgment test satisfies the Dendrite balance test); Krinsky v. Doe 6,
72 Cal. Rptr.3d 231 (Ct. App. 2008) (ruling that a plaintiff to make a prima facie
showing of the elements of libel in order to overcome a defendant’s motion to
quash a subpoena); In re Does 1-10, 242 S.W.3d 805 (Tex. App. 2007) (applying
the balance test of Dendrite); Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005) (modifying
the Dendrite standard).
51. See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 461 (showing a plaintiff must notify a defendant
when practicable).
52. See id. at 457.
53. See Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d at 450 (stating that the
court retained the notification factor of Dendrite and the summary judgment
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Maryland Court of Appeals used the Dendrite test in reversing the
lower court, stating that a court should (1) require the plaintiff to
identify the actionable statements, (2) determine whether a prima
facie case for defamation has been made, and (3) balance the right
to free speech against the strength of the prima facie case. 54
2. Virginia’s Good Faith Standard and Section 8.01–407.1
Under the good-faith standard, a court will grant a subpoena
ordering the unmasking of an anonymous poster if the pleadings or
evidence satisfy the court, if the requesting party has a legitimate,
good-faith belief that the speech was actionable, and if the
requested information is necessary to advance the claim. 55
Following the good-faith test, section 8.01-405.1 requires a party
seeking the identity of an anonymous poster to show either that the
poster has made one or more communications that are or may be
tortious or illegal, or that the party requesting the subpoena has a
legitimate, good faith basis to contend that it is the victim of
actionable conduct. 56 The statute also requires the party seeking
the identity of the anonymous user to show that the anonymous
user’s identity is important, central, or directly and materially
relevant to a claim or defense. 57
Under Virginia law, the elements of defamation are “(1)
publication of (2) an actionable statement with (3) the requisite
intent.” 58 To be actionable, the statement must be both false and
defamatory. 59 However, if the defamatory charge is true in
substance, then slight inaccuracies of expression are immaterial. 60

D. Yelp v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning
Yelp is a website that allows users to read and write local
business reviews. 61 To post, users must first register with the
standard of Cahill).
54. See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 457 (stating that all elements are required for
disclosure of the anonymous defendant’s identity).
55. See Geloo v. Doe, No. CL-2013-9646 2014 WL 2949508, at *5 (June 23,
2014) (stating that a plaintiff could satisfy section 8.01-407.1’s “good faith”
requirement simply by signing the complaint, meaning that all signed pleadings
would override the First Amendment).
56. Id.
57. VA. CODE. ANN. § 8.01-407.1(A)(1)(b) (2014).
58. See Jordan v. Kollman, 612 S.E.2d 203, 206 (Va. 2005).
59. See M. Rosenberg & Sons v. Craft, 29 S.E.2d 375, 378 (Va. 1944) (listing
five distinct categories of words that are defamatory).
60. See Jordan, 612 S.E.2d at 207 (discussing that plaintiffs must show that
a statement is substantively false).
61. See Yelp v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, 752 S.E.2d 554, 557 (Va. Ct. App.
2014) (discussing that contributors to Yelp have written over thirty-nine million
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website, a process that requires users to provide a valid email
address, choose a screen name to use when posting their reviews,
and designate a zip code of their own choosing as their location. 62
Yelp does not require users to identify or verify their legal names or
place of residence. 63 However, when users post a review, Yelp
records their Internet Protocol (IP) address and stores the IP
address in its administrative database. 64 Before posting business
reviews, Yelp users must agree to Yelp’s Terms of Service and
Content Guidelines (TOS) that require users to have actually been
customers of the business for which they are posting a review. 65
Hadeed Carpet Cleaning is a Virginia company that specializes
in cleaning consumer’s carpets. 66 As of October 19, 2012, the
business review website Yelp displayed seventy-five customer
reviews of Hadeed Carpet Cleaning and eight reviews of Hadeed
Carpet Cleaning’s related company, Hadeed Oriental Rug Cleaning
(collectively “Hadeed”). 67 Common themes among the negative
reviews were that Hadeed sometimes charged twice the advertised
price, charged for work not performed, and that rugs were
sometimes returned to the customer containing stains or defects. 68
Hadeed filed suit against the authors of seven specific
reviews, 69 alleging it had tried to match the reviews with its
customer database but could not find any record that the reviewers
were actually Hadeed customers. 70 Hadeed alleged that the posts
were false and defamatory. The only falsity alleged in the complaint
is the allegation that the posters were not actual customers of
Hadeed. 71 Of the seven anonymous reviewers against whom Hadeed
filed suit, six claimed that Hadeed overcharged and/or failed to

local reviews).
62. See id. (discussing the administrative procedures for creating a Yelp
account).
63. Id.
64. See Jack Goldsmith & Tim Wu, Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a
Borderless World 31 (2006) (explaining that an IP address is a unique address
assigned by an individual’s Internet service provider).
65. See Yelp, 752 S.E.2d at 558 (stating that the TOS require users to base
their reviews on their own personal experiences, and grants Yelp the authority
to remove post that it deems violates its TOS).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 567 (discussing the allegations Hadeed claimed were false and
defamatory).
69. See Complaint at 4, Yelp v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, 752 S.E.2d 554 (Va.
Ct. App. 2014) (No. 0116–13–4) (showing that Hadeed sued users Bob G., Chris
H., JS., YB., MP., Mike M., and Aris P.).
70. See Yelp, 752 S.E.2d at 567 (stating Hadeed determined that it simply
had no record that the negative reviewers were ever actually Hadeed
customers).
71. See id. at 558 (stating that Hadeed alleged that it tried to match the
negative reviews with its customer database but could find no record that the
negative reviewers were actually Hadeed customers).
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honor a quoted price. 72 Hadeed responded to several customer
reviews by promising that the feedback would help the company
improve. 73
Hadeed filed a complaint alleging defamation and conspiracy
to defame, alleging that the Doe defendants falsely represented
themselves as customers of Hadeed. 74 Hadeed alleged that it could
prove a prima facie case of impact on business. 75 However, during
oral arguments, Hadeed’s counsel admitted that it could not say
that the Doe defendants were not customers until Hadeed obtained
their identities. 76 Hadeed issued a subpoena duces tecum to Yelp,
under the authority of the First Amendment and the standards
enumerated in section 8.01-407.1, seeking documents revealing
information about the authors of each of the challenged reviews. 77
Yelp objected to the subpoena, contending that the First
Amendment protected its users from being identified unless the
plaintiff could present a prima facie case that their speech is
tortious. 78 Yelp contended that the Virginia courts should adopt the
First Amendment analysis adopted by state appellate courts
throughout the country, following the lead of Dendrite v. Doe. 79
The trial court enforced the subpoena, holding that section
8.01-407.1 sets forth a standard whereby it is sufficient for a wouldbe plaintiff against Doe defendants to show that statements “may
be tortious.” 80 The court concluded that if the posters of the seven
challenged Yelp reviews were not customers, the statements would
be tortious, and consequently, Hadeed had met the constitutional
and statutory standards sufficient to require Yelp to reveal the
identities of the Does. 81 Yelp argued that by holding it in contempt
for failing to comply with the order, the court stripped the Doe
72. See id. at 567 (stating that negative reviewers Bob G., YB, and Aris P.
use the theme that Hadeed doubled the price and negative reviewers Bob G.,
Chris H., MP., Mike M., and Aris P. criticize Hadeed’s advertising).
73. See, e.g., Brief for Yelp at 5, Yelp v. Hadeed 752 S.E.2d 554 Va. Ct. App.
(2014) (No. 0116-13-4) (showing Hadeed apologized to MP, one of the reviewers
it is suing).
74. Yelp, 752 S.E.2d at 558.
75. See id. at 566–67 (discussing how Hadeed had met the statutory
requirements under Virginia law allowing disclosure of the defendants’
identities).
76. See id. at 570 (quoting Hadeed’s counsel stating, “I don’t know whether
that person is a customer or not, and we suspect not.”).
77. See id. (stating the dissent maintains that the supporting material did
not suffice to justify issuance of the subpoena).
78. See id. at 558 (stating Yelp contended that Hadeed had not complied
with Virginia’s procedure for subpoenas to identify anonymous Internet users).
79. Id. at 695; see 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2001) (requiring both
a legal and an evidentiary showing that the suit has merit before a court may
deny users the First Amendment right to speak anonymously).
80. See id. at 558 (finding compliance with the statute and the First
Amendment, the trial court ruled to enforce the subpoena).
81. See id. at 566–67 (discussing that on appeal the court would review the
trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion).
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defendants of their First Amendment right to speak anonymously
without requiring Hadeed to show that it had legally and factually
sufficient claims against each defendant. 82 The Court of Appeals
affirmed the Circuit Court’s holding by applying Virginia’s
unmasking standard in Code section 8.01-407.1. 83
In rejecting Yelp’s argument, the court defined the reviews as
commercial speech, therefore giving them less protection under the
First Amendment. 84 The court held that the Doe’s “First
Amendment right to anonymity is subject to a substantial
governmental interest in disclosure so long as disclosure advances
that interest and goes no further than reasonably necessary.” 85 The
court also noted that a business’ reputation is a “precious
commodity.” 86 The Virginia Court of Appeals rejected Yelp’s
position to apply a standard similar to the Dendrite standard,
stating that in drafting section 8.01-407.1, the General Assembly
considered persuasive authority from other states. 87 The court
believed that by rejecting section 8.01-407.1 it would be forced to
hold the provision unconstitutional. 88

III. ANALYSIS
A. The Court of Appeals Erred by Incorrectly Holding
That Reviews and Criticism of Businesses Are Not
Entitled to Full First Amendment Protection
Courts have held that less protection is offered to “commercial
speech” as compared to literary, religious, or political speech. 89 By
categorizing the anonymous Yelp reviews as commercial speech, the
Virginia Court of Appeals wrongly subjected the Doe defendants to
a lower standard of First Amendment protection. 90

82. See id. (stating that Yelp also argued that the trial court erred “by
asserting subpoena jurisdiction over Yelp, which is a non-party, foreign
corporation”).
83. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-407.1 (2014).
84. See Yelp, 752 S.E.2d at 560–61 (distinguishing the level of protection the
First Amendment accords to literary, religious, or political speech as compared
to that accorded to commercial speech).
85. See id. at 561.
86. Id. at 561.
87. See id. at 566 (arguing that the Virginia Legislature had deliberately
refused to require an evidentiary showing that the lawsuit has potential merit).
88. See id. at 562 (showing that Yelp relies on persuasive authorities from
other states).
89 See id. at 560 (explaining that commercial speech is accord less First
Amendment protection than other forms of speech).
90. See id.
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1. The Court Incorrectly Determined the Doe Defendant’s
Reviews to be Commercial Speech, Subjecting Them to a
Lower Bar of First Amendment Protection
While anonymous speech can be defamatory, it can only be
punished in full accordance with First Amendment principles. 91 The
Supreme Court has also stated that while political speech may have
unpleasant consequences, it is “accorded greater weight to the
values of free speech than to the dangers of its misuse.” 92
Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals incorrectly concluded that the
anonymous Yelp reviews were entitled to less than full First
Amendment protection because they constituted commercial
speech. 93 This is a dangerous conclusion for all who use the Internet
and consumers everywhere, as millions of people rely on online
reviews in order to make decisions regarding what products and
services they purchase, where to travel, and many other choices. 94
Reviews by users can reveal problems and defects with products,
warn potential consumers of a product or service’s risks, and in
some cases, even lead companies to remedy the problem and do
right by the consumer. 95
The Court of Appeals misapplied the commercial speech
doctrine in reaching its decision. 96 In Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, the
Supreme Court held that expressions that were solely related to the
economic interest are offered less protection under the First
Amendment. 97 However, the Court made clear that this commercial
speech is an extremely narrow category and was limited only to
advertising that did no more than propose a commercial

91. See id. at 560 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 302 (1964))
(stating that defamation is not immune from constitutional limitations and
must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment).
92. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (citing
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630–31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
93. See Yelp, 752 S.E.2d at 560 (stating the Court finds it difficult to conceive
these reviews as anything other than commercial speech).
94. See Susannah Fox & Maeve Duggan, supra note 6 (reporting that 80
percent of Internet users consult online reviews).
95. See David Kirkpatrick, Why There’s No Escaping the Blog, FORTUNE
(Jan. 10, 2005), http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/
2005/01/10/8230982/index.htm (reporting that an anonymous review claiming a
flaw in a bike lock caused the company to replace approximately 100,000 locks
for free).
96. See Yelp, 752 S.E.2d at 560 (holding that the First Amendment affords
protection to literary, religious, or political speech as compared to that afforded
to commercial speech, and that the Doe’s anonymous reviews were commercial
speech).
97. See 447 U.S. 557, 561, 563 (1980) (stating that speech solely related to
the economic interests of the speaker and its audience are afforded less
protection).
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transaction. 98
Applying the factors laid out by the Fourth Circuit, the
anonymous Yelp reviews at the center of this case are not
commercial speech. 99 First and most importantly, the reviews at
issue propose no commercial transaction at all; the Does only
complained of problems they encountered during their transactions
with Hadeed. 100 These highly critical reviews also cannot be
considered advertisements by any stretch of the word. 101 Further,
like the vast majority of people who write online reviews, users on
Yelp derive no economic benefit from any of their reviews left on the
site. 102 The motivations of Yelp users to post reviews are varied,
such as sharing a personal experience or one’s personal opinion
about a business. 103 Therefore, the motivations of the anonymous
reviewers were unlike the motivations of the defendant in Lefkoe,
whose letter was solely related to the economic interest of the
speaker and its audience. 104
Lastly, while the reviews themselves do refer to a specific
service, Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, this alone is not enough to equate
the reviews to commercial speech. 105 If this factor alone were
sufficient to render something commercial speech, commercial
speech would subsume all criticism. 106 If a Yelp review were
98. See id. at 562 (stating that government has complete power to suppress
or regulate speech that “only serves the economic interest of the speaker, but
also assists consumers and furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible
dissemination of information”).
99. See Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, v. Mayor & City Council
of Balt., 721 F.3d 264, 285 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Bolger v. Young Drug Prods.,
463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983)) (stating that whether speech is an advertisement,
whether it refers to a specific product or service, and whether the speaker has
an economic motivation all affect whether speech is commercial).
100. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 580 (stating examples of speech
proposing a commercial transaction as a salesman’s solicitation, a broker’s offer,
and a manufacturer’s publication of a price list or the terms of his standard
warranty).
101. See Advertising, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009), available at
Westlaw BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (the reviews in question were critical
statements made about Hadeed and did not draw “the public’s attention to
something to promote its sale.”).
102. See Yelp Terms of Service § 6(A)(i), http://www.yelp.com/static?p=tos
(last visited Nov. 27, 2012) (banning “compensating someone or being
compensated to write or remove a review”).
103. See Yelp, 752 S.E.2d at 557, 568 (describing reasons for posting a Yelp
review).
104. See Lefkoe v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 577 F.3d 240, 248 (4th Cir.
2009) (stating that the letter did no more than request that the committee share
the letter with the company’s auditors, and held that this was solely related to
the economic interest of the speaker and its audience).
105. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 513–14 (1984)
(applying full First Amendment protection to review of a consumer product).
106. See id. at 513 (stating that erroneous statement is inevitable in free
debate and must be protected if freedoms of expression are to have the breathing
space that they need to survive).
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considered to be solely economic in nature purely because it refers
to a business transaction, trademark owners could prevent the use
of their marks in noncommercial context that they found to be
offensive. 107 Thus, they could shield themselves from criticism by
forbidding the use of their name in critical commentaries. 108
As previously stated, compelled identification of anonymous
persons encroaches on the First Amendment right of anonymous
speakers to remain anonymous; justification for infringing that
right requires proof of a compelling interest; and beyond that, the
restriction must be narrowly tailored to serve that interest. 109 Thus,
courts have had to decide whether the mere filing of a complaint
creates a compelling government interest or whether more is
required. 110 By erroneously assuming that the Yelp reviews were
commercial speech, the Court of Appeals incorrectly subjected the
Does to less protection against the subpoena than they would have
been offered had their reviews been seen as any other type of
speech. 111 And by giving this lesser protection to the Does, Hadeed
avoided the need to show a compelling interest to justify courtordered identification. 112

B. The Court Erred in Its Decision Because It
Incorrectly Held That Hadeed Made the Proper
Showing Required Before the Identification of John
Doe Speakers May Be Ordered in Claim of
Defamation
Under Virginia law, the elements of libel are “(1) publication of
(2) an actionable statement with (3) the requisite intent . . . . To be
actionable, the statement must be both false and defamatory.” 113
However, in Yelp v. Hadeed, Hadeed’s claim for defamation is
seriously flawed. He does not allege a valid claim of defamation
against the authors of the seven anonymous reviews, nor does the
complaint produce sufficient evidence supporting each element of
107. See CPC Int’l v. Skippy Inc., 214 F.3d 456, 462–463 (4th Cir. 2000)
(stating that criticism of a corporation and its business practices is alone not a
sufficient reason to enjoin speech).
108. Id.
109. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (explaining
that when a law burdens core political speech, it is upheld only if it is narrowly
tailored to serve an overriding state interest).
110. See id. (applying “extracting scrutiny”).
111. See Yelp v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, 752 S.E.2d 554, 561–62 (Va. Ct.
App. 2014) (arguing that the Does’ speech was commercial and therefore
enjoyed limited protection).
112. See id. at 561 (citing Lefkoe, 577 F.3d at 248–49) (stating that
commercial speech is subject to modes of regulation that might be impermissible
in the realm of noncommercial expression).
113. See Jordan v. Kollman, 269 Va. 569, 575 (2005).
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defamation to show that it has a claim for relief against the
defendants. 114
1. Because Hadeed Does Not Allege Any Substantive
Problems, Hadeed Does Not Have a Valid Claim of
Defamation
The elements of defamation in Virginia require the publication
of an actionable statement with the requisite intent. 115 However,
“slight inaccuracies of expression are immaterial provided the
defamatory charge is true in substance, and it is sufficient to show
that the imputation is substantially true.” 116 Therefore, as long as
the essence of a statement is substantially true, insignificant
inaccuracies will not give rise to a defamation claim. 117 While
claiming that Hadeed committed certain wrongdoings could be
defamatory, simply identifying oneself as a former customer of
Hadeed is immaterial compared to the reviewer’s substantive
claims. 118 Therefore, because this is the only allegation that Hadeed
made, the Court should not have allowed the insufficiently pled
defamation claim to persist. 119
Hadeed’s failure to allege that accusations of overcharging are
false undercuts his defamation claims because tortious
communications must be false. 120 Six of the seven online
communications claimed Hadeed overcharged and/or failed to honor
a quoted price. 121 However, Hadeed never indicated within his
complaint that the Doe defendants made false statements. 122
114. See Yelp, 752 S.E.2d at 558 (showing that Hadeed alleged that the
negative reviewers were not actual customers).
115. See Jordan, 269 Va. at 577 (stating the plaintiff “must demonstrate by
clear and convincing evidence that the defendant realized that his statement
was false or that he subjectively entertained serious doubt as to the truth of his
statement”).
116. See id. at 576 (quoting Saleeby v. Free Press, 197 Va. 761, 763 (1956)).
117. See AIDS Counseling & Testing Ctrs v. Grp. W Television, 903 F.2d
1000, 1004 (4th Cir. 1990) (stating that although the defendant’s statements
were false, they did not cause the story to produce a different effect on the
audience than would have been produced had the truth of the matter been
spoken); see also Chapin v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., 993 F.2d 1087, 1092 (4th Cir.
1993) (stating that a publication’s false statement and defamatory sting must
coincide).
118. See Saleeby, 197 Va. at 763 (explaining that if the defamatory charge is
true in substance, then any slight misrepresentations are immaterial).
119. See id. (noting that Hadeed did not refute that the defamatory charges
were not true in substance).
120. See Tharpe v. Saunders, 737 S.E.2d 890, 892 (Va. 2013) (stating that
“whether the quoted statement was made or not is certainly factual subject to
being disproved,” but “the basis for the claim of defamation is not dependent
upon that fact”).
121. See Yelp v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, 752 S.E.2d at 570 (stating that
one of the commenters claimed Hadeed had “shrunk” his rugs).
122. See id. (showing that in a few cases, Hadeed had apologized and
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Moreover, Hadeed chose not to sue several other commenters whose
reviews shared the same theme of the six who claimed that Hadeed
overcharged and/or failed to honor the quoted price. 123 Hadeed
posted responses to several posts that either ignore the accusations
about overcharging and misleading advertising, or acknowledge the
charge but apologize and promise to improve in future dealings. 124
Hadeed instead claimed that the Doe defendants may not have been
customers, and if they were not, the substantive statements may be
tortious. 125 By not including additional negative reviewers in his
lawsuit, it is likely Hadeed was able to match the negative reviews
to customers in the company’s database during its independent
investigation. 126 Consequently, even if the seven Doe defendants
were not actual Hadeed customers, the descriptions of false
advertising prices and price charges would be substantially true;
Hadeed did not file suit against other verified customers who made
the same allegations, and hence these allegations are not the proper
subject of a libel claim. 127
The only specific allegation of falsity made by Hadeed is that
the seven Doe defendants were not in fact customers of Hadeed. 128
This allegation alone does not state a valid claim of defamation
under Virginia law, 129 especially when Hadeed concedes that it is
uncertain whether the Yelp reviewers were customers or not. 130 The
dissenting opinion seems to agree, suggesting that Hadeed’s
argument is self-serving and proceeds from a premise the argument
is supposed to prove. 131

promised to improve in future dealings).
123. Complaint at 4, Yelp v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, 752 S.E.2d 554 (Va.
Ct. App. 2014) (No. 0116–13–4).
124. See id. (acknowledging that Hadeed responded to each negative review
with “Hadeed Carpet appreciates your feedback; we wish to address your
concerns but need your complete name and/or invoice number to contact you.
We stand behind our work, and are always seeking to improve our
communication and customer service.”)
125. See id. (stating that nowhere in this case has Hadeed claimed that any
of the substantive statements are false).
126. See Yelp, 752 S.E.2d at 570 (stating that Hadeed sued only those
reviewers who he could not find record of in the customer database).
127. See Saleeby, 197 Va. at 763 (stating that a defamation claim is not
actionable if an accusation is substantially true).
128. See Yelp, 752 S.E.2d at 570 (stating that Hadeed maintained the Doe
reviewers may not have been customers, and if they were not, the substantive
statements may be tortious).
129. See Jordan, 269 Va. at 575 (establishing that a statement must be both
false and defamatory to be actionable).
130. See Yelp, 752 S.E.2d at 570 (admitting during oral argument that it
cannot say the John Doe defendants are not customers until it obtains their
identities).
131. See id. (Haley, J., dissenting) (quoting Turpin v. Branaman, 58 S.E.2d
63, 67 (1950)) (stating, “If Hadeed were an individual, he would be attempting
to lift himself by his own bootstraps.”).
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2. Because Hadeed Presented No Evidence That the Doe
Defendants Made Any False Statements, Hadeed Does Not
Have a Valid Claim of Defamation
Under Virginia law, unless a plaintiff produces sufficient
evidence supporting each element of its cause of action to show that
it has a plausible chance of winning a lawsuit against a defendant,
no person should be subjected to compulsory identification via a
subpoena. 132 This requirement stops a plaintiff from being able to
identify his critics simply by filing a facially adequate complaint,
such as Hadeed claiming that they needed to identify the Doe
defendants simply to proceed with their case. 133 This requirement
has been followed by a majority of appellate and state courts that
has addressed the standard for identifying anonymous Internet
speakers. 134
To address this potential abuse in unmasking cases, courts
often require a party-seeking discovery of information protected by
the First Amendment to show that there is reason to believe that
the information sought will, in fact, help its case. 135 By requiring
this, courts ensure that plaintiffs meet a standard of creating
genuine issues of material fact on all issues in the case before they
are allowed to obtain the requested identities. 136 In cases that
feature valid defamation claims, the plaintiff is likely to have ample
means of proving that a statement is false and that it caused the
plaintiff harm. 137
132. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01–407.1(A)(1)(a)-(c)(2014) (defining the
“supporting material” to be attached to the request for an unmasking
subpoena duces tecum).
133. See Yelp, 752 S.E.2d at 556 (displaying Hadeed’s claim that it needed
the identities of the Doe defendants to determine if they were actual customers).
134. See, e.g., Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 441–42 (Md.
2009) (explaining that extrinsic facts must be alleged in the complaint to
establish the defamatory character of the words or conduct); Krinsky v. Doe 6,
159 Cal. App. 4th 1154, 1172 (2008) (requiring a prima facie showing of
elements of alleged torts of defamation); Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 460 (Del.
2005) (requiring plaintiffs to support their claim with facts sufficient to defeat
a summary judgment motion); Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 760
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (requiring that this requirement establishes
that an action can withstand a motion to dismiss).
135. See In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 680 F.2d 5, 6–9 (2d Cir.
1982) (denying compelled disclosure of press sources); Richards of Rockford v.
PGE, 71 F.R.D. 388, 390–391 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (denying compelled disclosure of
academic sources); cf. Schultz v Reader’s Digest, 468 F. Supp. 551, 566–567
(E.D. Mich. 1979) (denying compelled disclosure of magazine source).
136. See Cervantes v. Time, 464 F.2d 986, 994 (8th Cir. 1972) (stating that
mere speculation and conjecture are not sufficient).
137. See generally Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971)
(involving a man who was accused of being a distributor of obscene materials
on a radio broadcast after he was arrested. He won his defamation case because
the charges were dropped and he was able to prove that he was not with police
records).
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In Yelp, Hadeed claimed that it could show a prima facie case
of impact on business. 138 However, Hadeed’s complaint fails because
it has offered no evidence that anything said in the seven negative
reviews is false or has caused harm to Hadeed’s reputation. 139
Because Hadeed’s complaint fails to allege what steps it undertook
in its independent investigation, Hadeed has not attempted to prove
that the anonymous reviewers are not from actual customers. 140
Further, Hadeed’s complaint suggests that it was an absence of
information, rather than affirmative knowledge, that led Hadeed to
conclude that these specific anonymous reviewers were not previous
customers. 141
Additionally, the trial court had no basis for determining that
Hadeed had a legitimate belief that the specific reviewers it chose
to sue were not actually customers, given the absence of any specific
details of how Hadeed formulated that belief in the first place. 142
Hadeed alleged that it reviewed its “customer database,” but it
offered no explanation as to what information the database
contained that could allow it to match up with the reviews. This is
especially true because Yelp does not require reviewers to use their
real name or real location. 143 Because this is the claim of falsity
upon whic Hadeed has chosen to rest its entire defamation claim,
Hadeed should have been required to at the very least present
evidence supporting that its customer database contains sufficient
information and detail to support an inference that the individuals
who made the claims were not actually customers. 144 Hadeed is not
required to prove that the Doe defendants were not customers; it
only needs to present evidence sufficient to support an inference
that the Doe defendants were not customers. 145 With the lack of
evidence presented, the trial court should not have considered or
determined whether there existed a sufficient basis for overcoming
the Doe defendant’s First Amendment right to speak
138. See Yelp, 752 S.E.2d at 558 (stating that the negative reviews claiming
“shoddy service” affected their reputation and therefore future business).
139. See id. at 570 (Haley, J., dissenting) (stating that at no point does
Hadeed claim any of the substantive statements are false).
140. See id. (stating that Hadeed did not know if the review came from a
customer or not).
141. See App. 4 ¶ 17 (Complaint stating that “not only was Hadeed Carpet
unable to find any evidence that the negative reviewers were ever Hadeed
Carpet customers”).
142. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-407.1 (2014) (stating that a plaintiff needs a
legitimate, good faith basis for the belief that the conduct is tortious).
143. See Yelp, 752 S.E.2d at 557 (showing that Yelp does not require users
to use their real name or location).
144. See id. at 558, 570 (stating that the only falsity alleged in the complaint
is the assentation that the posters were not actual customers of Hadeed, and
that Hadeed admitted it could not say that the Doe defendants were not
customers until Hadeed obtains their identities).
145. See id. at 558 (explaining that § 8.01-407.1’s fourth prong only requires
a plaintiff to show that statements “may be tortious”).
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anonymously. 146
Further, Hadeed’s complaint is not valid because it fails to
allege material falsity of the negative anonymous Yelp reviews. 147
The First Amendment requires a defamation plaintiff to prove not
only literal falsity but also material falsity. 148 In Air Wisconsin
Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper, the Supreme Court explained that the
falsity of a statement is only material to a defamation claim if the
statement affects the subject’s reputation in the community. 149
However, in Yelp, Hadeed at no point denies that the negative
anonymous claims made against the business were false, nor does
it claim that the reviews affected its reputation in the community. 150
The only claim made by Hadeed is that the anonymous reviewers
were not actual customers, and because of that, the reviews were
false; whether or not the anonymous reviewers were actual
customers of Hadeed has no affect at all on Hadeed’s reputation in
the community. 151 Only the statements that the reviews made could
affect Hadeed’s reputation in the community. However, Hadeed
never alleged that the challenged reviews damaged its business
reputation within the community. 152
3. Hadeed’s Claims Are Deficient Under the Related
Doctrine That a Libel-Proof Plaintiff Cannot Sue for
Defamation because Other Customers Had Previously
Stated the Same Complaints Made By the Doe
Defendants
Under the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine, an alleged victim of
defamation can obtain damages only for incremental harm done to
his reputation by the defamation. 153 If an alleged defamation
victim’s reputation has already been destroyed in the same forum
where Doe defendants have expressed their views about the alleged
146. See id. (showing the trial court blindly accepted that Hadeed had a good
faith basis for believing the Doe defendants were not customers).
147. See id. (showing that Hadeed alleged that the negative reviewers were
not actual customers).
148. See Air Wis. Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. 852, 856 (2014)
(explaining that a materially false statement is one that would have a different
effect on the mind of the reader or listener from that which the truth would have
produced); Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991).
149. See Air, 134 S. Ct. 852 at 863 (holding that the reputational harm
caused by a false statement is its effect on a reader’s or listener’s mind).
150. See Yelp, 752 S.E.2d at 570 (stating that nowhere does Hadeed claim
any of the substantive statements are false).
151. See Saleeby v. Free Press, 197 Va. 761, 763 (1956) (explaining that if
the defamatory charge is true in substance, then any slight misrepresentations
are immaterial).
152. See Yelp, 752 S.E.2d at 558 (showing that Hadeed alleged only that the
negative reviewers were not actual customers).
153. See Note, The Libel-Proof Plaintiff Doctrine, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1909,
1921–22 (1985) (explaining different types of libel-proof plaintiffs).
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defamation victim, then the alleged defamation victim has no
remedy. 154
The fact that numerous other Yelp reviews which accuse
Hadeed of false advertisement and overcharging are uncontested by
Hadeed shows that even if the anonymous reviewers did not
personally have the negative experiences that they describe, it
would be implausible for Hadeed to allege that the presence of a few
more negative reviews would cause Hadeed any incremental
harm. 155 The strongest cases for applying the issue-specific branch
of the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine arise when the libel plaintiff has
been “criminally convicted for behavior similar or identical to that
described in the challenged communication.” 156 While the
allegations being made on Yelp against Hadeed are nowhere near
criminal, the same logic follows. Therefore, if the reviews being
made against Hadeed turn out to be true, then Hadeed’s reputation
would have already been ruined, making him a libel-proof
plaintiff. 157
The incremental libel-proof doctrine, which bars libel awards
when an article or broadcast contains highly damaging statements,
but the plaintiff challenges only a minor assertion in the
communication as false and defamatory, could also apply to
Hadeed. 158 While the anonymous reviewers made statements about
Hadeed’s misleading ads and overcharging, Hadeed fails to
challenge any of this and only asserts that the reviewers were not
actually Hadeed customers. 159

C. The Court Erred in Its Decision Because It
Misapplied Statute by Failing to Interpret Statute as
Vigorously as Required by the First Amendment
The Virginia Legislature enacted section 8.01-407.1 to guide
courts on how to decide when to allow compelled disclosure of

154. See Austin v. Am. Ass’n of Neurological Surgeons, 253 F.3d 967, 974
(7th Cir. 2001) (stating that if a plaintiff’s reputation has already been
destroyed by truthful information, he has no remedy).
155. See, e.g., Cerasani v. Sony Corp., 991 F. Supp. 343, 354–355 (S.D.N.Y.
1998) (taking judicial notice of Cerasani’s criminal record).
156. See The Libel-Proof Plaintiff Doctrine, supra note 152, at 1921–22
(stating that “[c]riminal convictions represent the paradigm of full and fair
litigation, and publicly reported convictions inevitably damage a prospective
libel plaintiff’s reputation severely”).
157. See Yelp, 752 S.E.2d at 570 (showing that a common theme of Yelp
complaints for Hadeed’s business relate to false advertisement and
overcharging, inferring that these allegations could be real).
158. See id.
159. See Brief for Yelp at 5, Yelp v. Hadeed 752 S.E.2d 554 Va. Ct. App.
(2014) (No. 0116-13-4) (discussing, for example, that Hadeed never denied that
it sometimes charges twice the advertised price).
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anonymous posters. 160 In its ruling, however, the court of appeals
failed to recognize multiple indicators in the language of section
8.01-407.1 that require a greater showing of tortious conduct before
identifying an anonymous speaker. 161 As the Supreme Court has
shown in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission and Talley v.
California, the First Amendment has long protected an individual’s
right to speak anonymously, and a strong interpretation of section
8.01-407.1 aligns with that right. 162 According to section 8.01-407.1,
a party is required to submit “supporting material” that supports
its unmasking request, requires a party asserting a claim to have a
“legitimate, good faith basis,” and contains inherent balancing
tests. 163 In its ruling, the Virginia Court of Appeals failed to apply
these components of the statute.
1. The Court Erred in Its Application of Section 8.01-407.1’s
“Supporting Material” Requirement, which Ensures a
Heightened Evidentiary Standard as Required by the
First Amendment
The language of section 8.01-407.1 has several provisions that
indicate a heightened evidentiary burden beyond a mere
declaration of a good faith belief that tortious conduct occurred.
Instead, the provisions require a party seeking a subpoena to
submit “supporting material showing” that the communications
may be tortious or that the party has a “legitimate, good faith basis”
to assert a claim. 164 A Virginia court has also stated that a plaintiff
merely stating that they believe that the speech in question is
tortious is insufficient without any supporting evidence. 165
The Court of Appeals acknowledges that a plaintiff must
submit evidence to satisfy the first subpart of section 8.01407.1(A)(1)(a), stating that there is no need to analyze the second
subpart of the prong if there is direct evidence demonstrating that
the communications are tortious, and the plaintiff provides that
160. See Yelp, 752 S.E.2d at 562 (stating that Virginia is one of the many
jurisdictions to develop its own unmasking standard).
161. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8-01-407.1 (requiring supporting material and a
“legitimate, good faith basis” for asserting a claim).
162. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341 (1995)
(stating that excluding anonymous publication from the marketplace of ideas is
not valid); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64–65 (1960) (invalidating a Los
Angeles ordinance that prohibited the distribution of all anonymous
pamphlets).
163. See § 8.01-407.1(A)(1)(a) (requiring supporting material and a
“legitimate, good faith basis” for asserting a claim).
164. Id.
165. See Geloo v. Doe, 140242 2014 WL 2949508 at *5 (Va. Cir. Ct. June 23,
2014) (citing Yelp, Inc. v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, Inc., 752 S.E.2d 554, 562
(Va. Ct. App. 2014)) (stating that a plaintiff could satisfy § 8-01-407.1 “good
faith” requirement simply by signing the complaint, meaning that all signed
pleadings would override the First Amendment).
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evidence to the circuit court. 166 However, the Court failed to require
Hadeed to produce sufficient evidence in support of section 8.01407.1’s second subpart, which requires a demonstration of a
“legitimate, good faith basis” for asserting a tort claim. 167 Hadeed
at no point offered any evidence suggesting that the substance of
John Doe defendants’ reviews were false, and its belief that the
reviewers were not actual customers of Hadeed was founded on pure
speculation. 168
2. The Court Failed to Examine the Strength of Hadeed’s
Claim to Ensure There Was a Legitimate, Good Faith
Basis for Asserting a Claim
In its opinion, the Court consistently paraphrases section 8.01407.1 as requiring the plaintiff to show it has “a legitimate, good
faith basis for its belief that the conduct is tortious.” 169 However, the
language of section 8.01-407.1 requires a showing that the plaintiff
“has a legitimate, good faith basis to contend that such party is
victim of conduct actionable in the jurisdiction where the suit was
filed.” 170 The Court’s substitution of the statute’s language with its
own is inaccurate, and the court should be looking not just at what
the plaintiff believes to be true, but also whether the plaintiff has a
legitimate basis for asserting its claim. 171 In deciding that because
Hadeed attempted to determine whether the Doe defendants were
actually customers by comparing its customer database to the Yelp
reviews, the Court of Appeals incorrectly held that Hadeed
demonstrated a legitimate, good faith belief that the reviews were
defamatory. 172 At no point did the court ever give any cognizable
regard to the word “legitimate.” 173 It is not enough for the court to
166. Yelp v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, 752 S.E.2d 554, 564 (Va. Ct. App.
2014); see also Geloo, 2014 WL 2949508 at *2 (stating that the first subpart
requires the court to look at whether there is direct evidence demonstrating that
the communications are tortious or not).
167. See § 8.01-407.1(A)(1)(a).
168. See Yelp, 752 S.E.2d at 570 (Haley, J., dissenting) (arguing that Hadeed
did not claim that any of the substantive statements were false and that the
statute requires the submission of evidence beyond merely alleging the
commenters were not customers because they were unidentifiable in their
database.
169. See id. at 564–67 (emphasis added) (stating that communications made
by the anonymous communicator are or may be tortious or illegal).
170. § 8.01-407.1(A)(1)(a) (emphasis added).
171. See Contend Definition, Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/contend (last visited Aug. 17, 2014) (defining “contend”
as “to argue or state something in a strong and definite way” and “maintain;
assert”).
172. See Yelp, 752 S.E.2d at 567 (declaring the second subpart had been met
because Hadeed established that it had no record of having provided services to
the posters).
173. See generally id. (showing that nowhere in the opinion does the court
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find that Hadeed had a good faith belief that the reviewers were not
customers; 174 the court must also determine whether this belief is
legitimate based on sufficient evidence, which was not presented by
Hadeed in this case. 175 Also, a plain reading of the statute would
require a court to look at whether a party has a “legitimate, good
faith basis to contend,” meaning, to assert, a cause of action; not the
word belief. 176 When read this way, it is necessary for the Court of
Appeals to look at the merits of Hadeed’s claim to determine
whether the party has a legitimate cause of action to unmask the
Doe defendants, which the court did not. 177
3. The Court Failed to Balance an Anonymous Speaker’s
First Amendment Rights Against the Plaintiff’s Interest
in Unmasking Speakers
While the Court of Appeals noted that within § 8.01-407.1 there
is an inherent balancing test of an anonymous speaker’s First
Amendment rights against the plaintiff’s interest in unmasking the
anonymous speakers within § 8.01-407.1, the court does not give the
appropriate weight to the First Amendment interests at stake. 178
The court first acknowledges that in regards to the second subpart
of § 8.01-407.1, there is no dispute that the Doe defendants “have a
constitutional right to speak anonymously over the Internet” which
must be balanced against Hadeed’s “right to protect its
reputation.” 179 However, nowhere in its opinion does the court
conduct a balancing analysis. 180
Second, the Court of Appeals noted that in order for Hadeed to
satisfy § 8.01-407.1’s fourth prong, 181 “a circuit court must

define legitimate).
174. See § 8.01-407.1(A)(1)(a) (requiring “that the party requesting the
subpoena has a legitimate, good faith basis to contend that such party is the
victim of” actionable conduct).
175. See Yelp, 752 S.E.2d at 570 (Haley, J., dissenting) (stating Hadeed’s
belief that the reviewers were not actual customers of Hadeed are founded on
pure speculation).
176. See § 8.01-407.1(A)(1)(a); Contend Definition, Merriam-Webster, supra
note 170.
177. See Yelp, 752 S.E.2d at 570 (Haley, J., dissenting) (asserting that
Hadeed’s claim that the Doe defendants were not customers had no legitimacy).
178. See id. at 566 (acknowledging that the Doe defendant’s rights must be
balanced against Hadeed’s rights).
179. See id. (laying out the balancing test to be implemented); see also Geloo
v. Doe, 140242 2014 WL 2949508 at *5 (Va. Cir. Ct. June 23, 2014) (stating that
the court must balance a defendant’s constitutional right to speak anonymously
over the Internet with a plaintiff’s right to protect her reputation).
180. See generally Yelp, 752 S.E.2d 554 (showing how the court ultimately
failed to implement the balancing test discussed).
181. See § 8.01-407.1(A)(1)(c) (requiring the plaintiff to show that the
identity of the Doe defendants is important, is centrally needed, relates to a core
claim, or is directly and materially relevant).
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necessarily balance the interests of the anonymous communicator
against the interests of the plaintiff in discovering the identity of
the anonymous communicator.” 182 However, the court does not
make this analysis, stating:
Turning to the fourth prong, we find that the identity of the Doe
defendants is important, is centrally needed to advance the claim, is
related to the claim or defense, or is directly relevant to the claim or
defense. Without the identity of the Doe defendants, Hadeed cannot
move forward with its defamation lawsuit. There is no other option.
The identity of the Doe defendants is not only important, it is
necessary. 183

The court disregards the defendant’s First Amendment rights
by incorrectly concluding that the Yelp reviews were commercial
speech, subjecting the reviews to a lower bar of First Amendment
protection. 184 The Court of Appeals, while acknowledging that the
rights must be balanced, gives zero weight to the Doe defendant’s
First Amendment rights. 185

D. The Virginia Court of Appeals’ Reasoning For Not
Rejecting Section 8.01-407.1 Was Erroneous Because
It Misinterpreted the Legislatures Intent
In its ruling, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on the
argument that the Virginia Legislature had deliberately refused to
follow the example of other states that require an evidentiary
showing that the lawsuit has potential merit. 186 The court declined
to declare § 8.01-407.1 unconstitutional, stating that they were
“reluctant to declare legislative acts unconstitutional, and will do so
only when the infirmity is clear, palpable, and practically free from
doubt.” 187 However, the Courts argument for not rejecting § 8.01407.1 contains several flaws.

182. Yelp, 752 S.E.2d at 565.
183. Id. at 568.
184. See supra Part III(A)(1) (discussing how commercial speech is subject
to lesser First Amendment protection).
185. See Yelp, 752 S.E.2d at 568 (showing that the court does not balance
the right of the anonymous speaker).
186. See id. at 566 (stating that in drafting § 8.01-407.1, the General
Assembly considered persuasive authority from other states and made the
policy decision to include or exclude factors that other states use in their
unmasking standards).
187. See id. at 565 (stating that there is a strong presumption in favor of the
constitutionality of statutes).
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1. The Court Was Incorrect in Ruling that It Could Not Apply
a Different Unmasking Standard Without Finding the
Virginia Statute Unconstitutional
In Yelp, the Court of Appeals took the opinion that by
embracing Yelp’s position to apply a summary judgment standard
similar to those laid out in both Dendrite and Cahill, it would be
forced to hold § 8.01-407.1 unconstitutional. 188 However, there are
many situations in which a state statute, a federal statute, and the
Constitution provide alternate bases for individuals to assert rights
against government action. For example, when a court considers a
subpoena seeking to identity a reporter’s sources or outtakes, and
the court decides first whether the statutory shield applies, and
then decides whether the constitutional shield applies. 189 Other
courts generally do not feel obligated to declare state shield laws
unconstitutional just because the First Amendment provides more
protection. 190 They simply see them as offering alternate paths to
relief. 191
2. The Court of Appeals Was Incorrect in Deciding That the
Adoption of § 8.01-407.1 Represented a Policy Choice to
Reject Persuasive Authority from Other States
The Court of Appeals incorrectly held that it could not follow a
constitutional analysis that went beyond § 8.01-407.1 without
rejecting what it assumed to have been the legislative policy choice
to reject the approach taken by courts in several other states, such
as the New Jersey Appellate Division in Dendrite. 192 However, the
report itself does not support the notion that its consideration by
the Legislature implies a rejection of the Dendrite standard for
several reasons. First, the report was completed in 2001, several
188. See id. at 562 (showing that by arguing for a required showing of merit
on both law and facts before a subpoena duces tecum to identify an anonymous
speaker, Yelp relies on persuasive authorities from other states).
189. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1975) (providing an absolute privilege
to journalists working in the fields specified by the statute); CAL. EVID. CODE §
1070 (West 2014) (providing a qualified privilege in criminal cases); MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112 (LexisNexis 2010) (providing a qualified
privilege in civil and criminal cases that covers confidential as well as nonconfidential information).
190. See, e.g., Holmes v. Winter, 3 N.E.3d 694, 701 (N.Y. 2013) (stating that
the state shield statute protected a reporter from revealing her sources in an
exclusive she wrote regarding the contents of a mass shooter’s notebook); c.f.,
Too Much Media v. Hale, 993 A.2d 845, 858 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010)
(stating the state shield law protects have some connection to a publication that
is similar to traditional media).
191. See Holmes, 3 N.E.3d at 701 (discussing the differences between the
New York Constitution and the state’s Shield Laws).
192. See Yelp, 752 S.E.2d at 566 (finding that the Virginia General Assembly
considered and rejected factors from other state’s unmasking standards).
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years before any national consensus or standard requiring evidence
and not just allegations had developed. 193 Instead of reporting a
range of factors that other states used in their unmasking
standards, as the majority opinion in Yelp characterized it, 194 the
report noted the lack of authority from other jurisdictions 195 and
that no state or federal appellate court had yet endorsed a
particular formulation regarding the level of scrutiny or balancing
test to be applied. 196 The report also incorrectly states that the
Dendrite court’s approach requires even less than a “full motion to
dismiss standard.” 197
3. Section 8.01-407.1 Incorporates the Evidence
Requirement That Other States Have Held to be Required
by the First Amendment
Section 8.01-407.1(A)(1)(a) requires a plaintiff seeking
discovery to show that the communications that are or may be
tortious or illegal have been made by the anonymous communicator,
or that the party requesting the subpoena has a legitimate, good
faith basis to contend that such party is the victim of conduct
actionable in the jurisdiction. 198 While the court interpreted this
statute to be lenient and require Hadeed to only believe the
anonymous reviews could possibly be defamatory, each prong of the
statute actually replicates what the courts in other states are trying
to accomplish by their evidence-requiring First Amendment
tests. 199 However, the court decided to ignore the statutory
standards and the multi-jurisdictional approach and instead
allowed Hadeed to bring a defamation claim without presenting any
evidence that the statement made about Hadeed was false, or that

193. Cases influenced by Dendrite that requiring a strict showing of
evidence. See, e.g., Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 463 (Del. 2005); Mobilisa, Inc. v.
Doe, 170 P.3d 712, 720 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (rejecting plaintiff’s assertion to
adopt the less stringent standards set forth in Sony Music and Seescandy.com);
Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 244–245 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
194. Yelp, 752 S.E.2d at 566 (rejecting persuasive authority from other
states on the basis that the Virginia Legislature considered these factors).
195. See Dep’t of Educ., DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONIC DATA 23–24 (2001),
available at http://leg2.state.va.us/dls/h&sdocs.nsf/fc86c2b17a1cf388852570f90
06f1299/51339235f994794285256b21006a2406/$FILE/SD9_2002.pdf.
196. See id. at 24 (stating that no state or federal appellate court has yet
endorsed a particular formulation of the level of scrutiny or balancing test to be
applied in this precise context, where the fundamental right of anonymous free
speech is implicated in a private litigation where the identity of the author is
arguably necessary to the outcome).
197. See id. at 26–27.
198. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8-01-407.1(A)(1)(a) (West 2014).
199. See Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2001) (showing that the words “are or may be tortious” are comparable to the
prima facie principles in Dendrite and similar cases).
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the statement has caused damage to its business reputation. 200 If
the court had interpreted section 8.01-407.1 correctly and required
an evidentiary showing from Hadeed, Hadeed’s lack of a claim and
lack of reputational harm, the identifying information would not
have even been needed, as the claim could not succeed even if the
identifying information were obtained, paralleling the Dendrite
standard. 201 When looking at the first prong of section 8.01407.1(A)(1)(a), the words “are or may be tortious” are comparable to
the prima facie principles in Dendrite and similar cases, which use
the existence of evidence of falsity and damages to test whether the
plaintiff has a realistic claim or only an imaginary one. 202 Similarly,
under the second part of subsection (a), the plaintiff must do more
than show good faith; they must also show a “legitimate” basis for
claiming that the speech was tortious. 203 This requirement parallels
the rule in other states that a plaintiff seeking relief must show an
evidentiary basis for their claim. 204 In addition, under subsection
(b) of section 8.01-407.1, the plaintiff must show that identifying
information is “centrally needed to advance the claim,” or relates to
a “core claim or defense,” or is “directly and materially related to
that claim.” 205 Therefore, if the plaintiff bringing the defamation
claim does not even have evidence that a statement about the
plaintiff is false, just like in Hadeed’s case, 206 or evidence that the
statement has caused damage to its business reputation, then the
identifying information is not needed, and the claim could still not
succeed even if the identifying information were obtained. 207 Thus,
Hadeed’s admission that he is uncertain whether or not his claim is
true and his failure to show any damage to his reputation makes it
impossible for his claim to succeed.

200. See Brief for Yelp at 5, Yelp v. Hadeed 752 S.E.2d 554 Va. Ct. App.
(2014) (No. 0116-13-4) (explaining that Hadeed never denied that it sometimes
charges twice the advertised price).
201. See Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 756 (showing that the plaintiff in a
defamation case must show sufficient evidence on each element of the cause of
action to demonstrate a prima facie claim).
202. See id.
203. See § 8-01-407.1(A)(1)(a).
204. See, e.g., Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760–61 (requiring an evidentiary
showing); see also Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005) (requiring plaintiffs
to support claim with facts sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion).
205. See § 8-01-407.1(A)(1)(b).
206. See Yelp v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, 752 S.E.2d 554, 570 (Va. Ct. App.
2014) (stating that Hadeed did not know if the anonymous reviewers were
customers or not).
207. This requirement parallels the Dendrite standard for adjudicating
subpoenas.
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4. The Court Erred by Interpreting Section 8.01-407.1 to
Allow Disclosure of Any Speech That “May Be Tortious”
Simply Based on an Unsupported Allegation, which Is
Inconsistent with the First Amendment
Under § 8.01-407.1, if the identity of the speaker is sufficiently
material to a core claim or defense, the requester “must show that
one or more communications that are or may be tortious or illegal
have been made by the anonymous communicator.” 208 However, a
defendant’s First Amendment rights are not protected when the
statute’s requirement that the communication “may be tortious” is
read too narrowly, as it holds that a plaintiff’s mere allegation
without further evidence is sufficient to identify the speaker. 209 The
Court of Appeals cited to several different cases when arguing that
defamatory speech is not entitled to the same protection as truthful
or political speech, and thus, the First Amendment did not apply in
this case. 210 Neither the Virginia cases nor the Supreme Court cases
cited by the trial court are applicable here, because they rely on an
adjudication of defamation. 211
While speech is not protected if it is proven false, revealing the
identity of a speaker before the plaintiff offers such proof eliminates
the interest in remaining anonymous, which cannot be restored if
the proof is later, found to be insufficient, and the loss of the First
Amendment right can be significant. 212
In light of the constitutional rights that were at stake during
this case, the court should have looked not only at section 8.01407.1, but also looked at the entire issue more broadly. 213 The Court
of Appeals threw out the First Amendment rights of the anonymous
reviewers by not compelling Hadeed to come forth with any material
evidence at all, essentially determining that leaving a review is
enough reason to satisfy the good faith requirement of section 8.01407.1. 214 This precedent, if unchecked, could lead to readily
208. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-407.1(A)(1)(a)–(c).
209. See Yelp, 752 S.E.2d at 566–67 (showing that Hadeed’s mere allegation
of defamation was enough for the court to find good faith basis).
210. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (stating that
libelous utterances are not within the area of constitutionally protected speech).
211. See Yelp, at 752 S.E.2d at 566–67 (stating that a defamation claim
depends on an unproven assumption).
212. See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (stating that losing
First Amendment freedom, regardless for how long, unquestionably constitutes
irreparable injury); Melvin v. Doe, 836 A.2d 42, 50 (Pa. 2003) (holding that once
an identity is disclosed, the “First Amendment claim is irreparably lost as there
are no means by which to later cure such disclosure”).
213. See Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093 (W.D. Wash.
2001) (observing that stripping Internet users of anonymity by a civil subpoena
would significantly affect Internet communications and thus infringe on basic
First Amendment rights).
214. See Yelp, 752 S.E.2d at 567 (stating Hadeed had a good faith basis
because it could find no proof of the posters being customers).
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obtainable subpoenas that allow businesses and corporations to
react to negative feedback and intimidate their critics into
silence. 215

E. The Court of Appeals Erred By Not Following the
National Consensus Standard of the Balancing Test
The consensus approach followed in many states requires a
plaintiff to come forward with both legal argument and an
evidentiary basis showing that the plaintiff has a realistic claim
against the anonymous speakers that it seeks to identify through
compulsory process. These courts have recognized that the best
standard to use is one that “strikes the right balance between the
interests of the accused defendant’s First Amendment right to
speak anonymously” with the plaintiff’s interest in “attaining
reparation for allegedly tortious speech.” 216
1. The National Consensus Standard Is a Dendrite
Balancing Test, under which Plaintiffs with Valid
Claims Routinely Succeed, while Providing Protection
Against Needless Loss of the Right to Speak Anonymously
Although Virginia has never been presented with the issue
unmasking anonymous internet users, the issue is not as novel
around the rest of the country. 217 About a dozen other states having
encountered the same question and their holdings are squarely at
odds with the holding of the Virginia Court of Appeals. 218 These
courts have each recognized that best standard to use in cases like
215. See Lyrissa Barnet Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation &
Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 881–82 (2000) (stating, “The mere
fact of being uncovered may itself be enough to stop the alleged defamer from
posting further messages.”).
216. See generally In re Indiana Newspapers, 963 N.E.2d 534 (Ind. App.
2012).
217. See, e.g., cases New Jersey, Maryland, Delaware, Arizona, California,
Indiana, New Hampshire, Texas, Pennsylvania, and the District of Columbia.
218. See, e.g., In re Indiana Newspapers, 963 N.E.2d 534, 552 (Ind. App.
2012) (adopting the modified Dendrite test); Pilchesky 1 v. Gatelli, 12 A.3d 430,
445 (Pa. Super. 2011) (stating that the reviewing court must conduct the
Dendrite balancing test); Mortgage Specialists v. Implode-Explode Heavy
Indus., 999 A.2d 184, 193 (N.H. 2010) (ordering the trial court to apply Dendrite
test); Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941, 954 (D.C. 2009) (employing some aspects
of the Dendrite test); Independent Newspapers v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 457 (Md.
2009) (favoring the Dendrite test); Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr.3d 231 (Cal.
App. 2008) (ruling that a plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of the elements
of libel in order to overcome a defendant’s motion to quash a subpoena); In re
Does 1–10, 242 S.W.3d 805 (Tex. App. 2007) (endorsing the Highfields Capital
test); Mobilisa v. Doe, 170 P.3d 712 (Ariz. App. 2007) (adopting a Dendrite–
Cahill hybrid standard); Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005) (creating the
Cahill standard).
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this rests on the need to strike just the right balance between the
interests of the accused defendant’s First Amendment right to
speak anonymously with the plaintiff’s interest in attaining
reparation for allegedly tortious speech. 219 While the opinion of the
Court of Appeals seems to suggest that the other states that have
tackled this issue have reached varying results, there is actually
significant consistency in standards adopted around the country. 220
Various courts have held that a plaintiff cannot unmask a
defendant alleged of engaging in defamatory speech without first
presenting admissible evidence of the elements of the cause of
action that the plaintiff alleges. 221 Two courts have created their
own rules either to require evidence before the subpoena can be
sought, or to give the Doe defendant the opportunity to obtain a
protective order if such evidence is not provided. 222 And of the ten
states requiring admissible evidence of the elements of the cause of
action that the plaintiff alleges before a defendant can be
unmasked, six apply an equitable balancing test even if the plaintiff
meets the presenting minimal evidence. 223 Virginia is not the only
state that has refused to compel the disclosure of identifying
information without any evidence, thereby declining to protect First
Amendment anonymous speech rights. 224
219. Id.
220. Appellate courts in Arizona, California, Delaware, Indiana, Maryland,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Texas, and the District of
Columbia have all followed the standard set in Dendrite v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756
(N.J. App. 2001).
221. In re Indiana Newspapers, 963 N.E.2d 534 (Ind. App. 2012); Pilchesky
1 v. Gatelli, 12 A.3d 430 (Pa. Super. 2011); Mortgage Specialists v. ImplodeExplode Heavy Indus., 999 A.2d 184 (N.H. 2010); Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d
941 (D.C. 2009); Independent Newspapers v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432 (Md. 2009);
Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr.3d 231 (Cal. App. 2008); In re Does 1–10, 242
S.W.3d 805 (Tex. App. 2007); Mobilisa v. Doe, 170 P.3d 712 (Ariz. App. 2007);
Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005).
222. See Maxon v. Ottawa Pub. Co., 929 N.E.2d 666 (Ill. App. 3d Dist. 2010)
(discussing the Illinois standard that a party seeking the identity of an
unknown defendant comply with the specific requirements of a Rule 224
petition); Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch. v. Doe 1, 833 N.W.2d 331 (Mich. App.
2013) (choosing to address the issue only under the state rules of court);
Ghanam v. Does, 845 N.W.2d 128, 2014 WL 26075 (Mich. App. Jan. 2, 2014)
(endorsing the Dendrite approach).
223. See generally Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2001) (stating the court must balance the defendant’s First
Amendment right of anonymous free speech against the strength of the prima
facie case presented and the necessity for the disclosure of the anonymous
defendant’s identity to allow the plaintiff to properly proceed); In re Indiana
Newspapers, 963 N.E.2d 534 (Ind. App. 2012) (adopting the modified Dendrite
test); Pilchesky 1 v. Gatelli, 12 A.3d 430 (Pa. Super. 2011) (stating the reviewing
court must conduct the Dendrite balancing test); Mortgage Specialists v.
Implode-Explode Heavy Indus., 999 A.2d 184 (N.H. 2010) (ordering the trial
court to apply Dendrite test); Mobilisa v. Doe, 170 P.3d 712 (Ariz. App. 2007)
(adopting a Dendrite–Cahill hybrid standard).
224. See, e.g., 4 Highfields Capital Mgmt. v. Doe, 385 F. Supp. 2d 969, 976
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While plaintiffs who have genuine defamation claims can
easily meet the national consensus standard, the showing that the
Virginia Court of Appeals held to be acceptable under section 8.01407.1 is so low that it essentially provides a “license to unmask”
without any basis. 225 Knowing that trial courts will not demand an
evidentiary basis, as seen in this case, future plaintiffs can simply
claim that they have doubts that an anonymous critic is actually
one of its customers, even if the critic’s speech is typical of what
many other consumers have already said about the business. 226 The
decision by the Court of Appeals sets a very dangerous precedent
and hence runs afoul of the First Amendment right to speak
anonymously. 227

IV. CONCLUSION
Anonymity has a long history in American discourse, and it has
played a vital role in the evolution of our country. 228 The concept of
anonymous speech is one of the main pillars of a truly free society,
by allowing the free flow of beliefs, expressions, and opinions into
the public market of ideas without the threat of fear. 229 With the
invention of the Internet, this market of ideas is now open at all
hours of the day and night and any person with a phone line can
“become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it
could from any soapbox.” 230 At no time in history has any given
person ever held as much power as they do today, and while this
has allowed for innovation and revolution that would have been
impossible to achieve only fifteen years ago, it has also opened the
door for new methods of destruction and harm. 231
(N.D. Cal. 2005) (requiring an evidentiary showing followed by express
balancing of “the magnitude of the harms that would be caused to the competing
interests”); Art of Living Foundation v. Does 1–10, 2011 WL 5444622 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 9, 2011) (endorsing the Highfields Capital test).
225. See Yelp, 752 S.E.2d at 570 (Haley, S.J., dissenting) (stating that the
majority’s holding of § 8.01-407.1 allows a business to identify an anonymous
critic without any material evidence).
226. Id.
227. See id. (stating that the balance envisioned by § 8.01–407.1 should
weigh for the protection afforded by our Constitutions).
228. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 360 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing an example of the “outpouring of
anonymous political writing that occurred during the ratification of the
Constitution”).
229. See Doe v. 2TheMart.com, 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093 (W.D. Wash.
2001) (observing that “[i]f Internet users could be stripped of that anonymity by
a civil subpoena enforced under the liberal rules of civil discovery, this would
have a significant chilling effect on Internet communications and thus on basic
First Amendment rights”).
230. See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997)
(illustrating the effect of the Internet on communication).
231. Noam Cohen & Brian Stelter, Iraq Video Brings Notice to a Web Site,
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The decision in Yelp v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning has significant
ramifications for the future of anonymous speech, and while this
case is already on its way to the Supreme Court of Virginia, this
issue will almost certainly see its day at the United States Supreme
Court in the very near future. 232 When the Supreme Court of
Virginia hears this case later on this year, the Court should take
into account all of section 8.01-407.1’s pitfalls and First Amendment
issues and strike it down. 233
At the very least, the Supreme Court of Virginia must review
the Court of Appeals decision in Yelp v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning
and declare that even with section 8.01-407.1’s extremely low
standards, Hadeed did not allege any substantive claims, nor did it
present any evidence that false statements were made. 234 Further,
the Court of Appeals should have interpreted the language in
section 8.01-407.1 more vigorously, as to require a stronger
evidentiary showing standard, as well as a stronger balancing
test. 235
Perhaps most importantly, the Supreme Court of Virginia
must reject the Court of Appeals ruling that the anonymous Yelp
reviews equaled commercial speech. 236 The Court of Appeals
reasoning in this decision is strange, as case law states that
commercial speech is speech that proposes a commercial
transaction, something that is totally absent in all of the Yelp
reviews. 237
The Court of Appeals was incorrect in finding that Hadeed’s
claim of defamation was valid and by ruling the Doe defendant’s
anonymous reviews to be commercial speech. 238 The Court also
should have rejected section 8.01-407.1 due to its constitutional

N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/07/world/07wiki
leaks.html (stating that we live in a world where people can do both good and
terrible things without accountability).
232. See Yelp v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, Inc., 752 S.E.2d 554, 566 (Va. Ct.
App. 2014) (rejecting persuasive authorities following the national consensus).
233. See id. at 570 (Haley, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority’s holding
of § 8.01-407.1 allows a business to identify an anonymous critic without any
material evidence).
234. See id. (stating, “Nowhere in this cause has Hadeed claimed that any
of the substantive statements are false.”).
235. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-407.1 (requiring supporting material and a
“legitimate, good faith basis” for asserting a claim and requiring a plaintiff to
submit “supporting material” that supports its unmasking request).
236. See Yelp, 752 S.E.2d at 560–61 (stating that the reviews were
commercial speech and therefore subject to lesser First Amendment protection).
237. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y.,
447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980) (defining commercial speech as limited only to
advertising that did no more than “propose a commercial transaction”).
238. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 580 (stating examples of speech
proposing a commercial transaction as “[a] salesman’s solicitation, a broker’s
offer, and a manufacturer’s publication of a price list or the terms of his
standard warranty”).
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issues and adopted the much stronger Dendrite standard that has
already been accepted in the majority of the country. 239 For these
reasons, the Supreme Court of Virginia should reverse this case
when it hears it later this year. 240

239. See, e.g., Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432 (Md. 2009)
(stating that extrinsic facts must be alleged in the complaint to establish the
defamatory character of the words or conduct); Krinsky v. Doe 6, 159 Cal. App.
4th 1154, 1172 (2008) (requiring plaintiffs to make prima facie showing of
elements of alleged torts of defamation); Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 460 (Del.
2005) (requiring plaintiffs to support claim with facts sufficient to defeat a
summary judgment motion).
240. Yelp Inc. v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, 752 S.E.2d. 554 (Va. App. Ct. App.
2014), cert. granted, 2014 Va. LEXIS 84 (May 29, 2014) (No. 140242).
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